Abstract
Introduction
Online abuse or abusive behaviour involving social media can take a variety of forms 1 . It is a growing phenomenon that has become punctuated by an increase in charges and convictions brought against users of social media 2 . This article focuses on two particular aspects of online abuse : the publication of menacing communications 3 and those that, although of a trivial nature, infringe privacy. It does so in order to explore the development of these types of online abuse, highlighting the ease with which communicators may cause harm and the avenues of legal redress (both criminal and civil) that are potentially available to victims of Similarly, empirical findings suggest that individuals are highly motivated to use SNSs for presenting themselves 24 . This may also be driven by a misplaced presumption that online behaviour is private and therefore users do not anticipate that information will be seen by countless others 25 . In other words, perceptions of private space online may be flawed 26 . This standpoint is further entrenched because of the ease by which online communicators are able to achieve anonymity online. Anonymity has, of itself, become an integral feature of cyber culture, with online participants relying on their anonymity as "a disinhibiting factor affecting what people are prepared to say in this special environment" 27 . Accordingly, anonymity may be credited with being one of the driving forces behind the popularity of SNSs and, because anonymity provides an opportunity for individuals to participate in society without being identified, and, therefore, without needing to be accountable 28 , it provides a means by which individuals can more easily violate the privacy of others 29 .
It is contentious to suggest that users are unaware of the risks associated with social media.
Young and Quan-Haase, for example, observe that "Users, however, are not necessarily naıve in their disclosure practices… users are actively engaged in guarding their data and are not passive..." 30 . Similarly, Palfrey and Gasser suggest that the younger generation of "digital natives" are becoming increasingly aware of the threats associated with the use of modern information technologies and adjust their behaviour accordingly, such that "the habit among young people of sharing many of the details of their everyday life … is neither random nor uncontrolled. They are … more conscious of what they are doing than they are perceived to be" 31 . However, the authors also acknowledge that "rarely do they have in view the full impact of their decision to disclose…" 32 Therefore, it is reasonable to suggest that the facility for communication afforded by modern technology, particularly the ease with which communications may be sent and the possibilities for wide -even world widedissemination carry with them dangers for the unwary and unwise in choosing not only what they communicate but how they do so.
In practice, therefore, we effectively live in a world of information overload. However,
whilst much of what is posted is trivial information created to encourage the nurturing of online relationships, it is very easy to publish material that could lead to online abuse. It appears that an increasing number of transgressions are being carried out using this medium 33 . Nonetheless, whilst the law may penalise people if they send ill-advised messages, with perpetrators possibly facing court proceedings over their online behaviour, people send them regardless and in great number, in part due to the ease with which the internet and social media facilitate communications.
Consequently, the law appears marginal and this begs two principal questions, which are addressed below, namely:- 
Liability in law
Criminal Law
The Big Brother report suggests that "the social media revolution has changed the way people communicate with each other. Yet, whilst our communications have evolved the way crimes are dealt with has not … we find ourselves using archaic legislation to police modern day crimes.… the laws that regulate what is said on social media … are woefully out of date" 34 .
It is indeed the case that this arm of law was almost entirely enacted before the intervention of social media and is therefore arguably actually inappropriate for the prosecution of offences committed using social media. So, if a person or persons who receive or read it, or may reasonably be expected to receive, or read it, would brush it aside as a silly joke, or a joke in bad taste, or empty bombastic or ridiculous banter, then it would be a contradiction in terms to describe it as a message of a menacing character. In short, a message which does not create fear or apprehension in those to whom it is communicated, or who may reasonably be expected to see it, falls outside this provision, for the very simple reason that the message lacks menace."
He pointed out that the meaning of a message had to be considered in both its context and with reference to the means by which the message was sent. He noted that the Crown Court had been concerned that it was sent at a time of public concern about the threat of terrorism.
Even when examined in context, however, it did not, he thought, constitute a threat. It had been posted on Twitter for general reading and was not directed to any staff at the airport. He was of the view that the language and punctuation were inconsistent with it being a threat and that, in any event, it was unusual in a terrorist threat for the writer to be readily identified.
The reaction of readers was also relevant. There was no reaction from readers at large and the airport staff did not take it seriously. The fact that the airport staff reported it was more a matter of procedure than alarm. Only when South Yorkshire Police became involved did the matter escalate and, even then, there was a lack of urgency in their response.
The approach of the Divisional Court is surely correct in insisting that the words used must be examined, not in isolation, but with reference to their context and the medium through which the message containing them is promulgated. What it does not do, and cannot do, is to provide a guide as to the interpretation of any given message. This remains a matter for individual judgement on the part of those reading the message.
The root of the problem in Chambers was the way in which his tweet was interpreted and the consequent decisions that were taken in respect of it. In the initial task of interpretation, the Lord Chief Justice urged the adoption of common sense. It is undoubtedly difficult, in some instances, to distinguish between the genuine threat and the attempt at humour in the written word. This is an exercise, though, that a range of organisations and individuals have to undertake on a daily basis, not least of whom are the security services. There are historical precedents for large scale issues of this kind. By way of example, the original prohibition on from exposure to such items 44 . In the 1970s, a spate of bomb hoaxes caused not only legislation 45 to attempt to deal with the phenomenon but also required the exercise of judgement on the part of the police, and those in places such as schools and public buildings, as to which were genuine threats and which were hoaxes that could safely be ignored. For these reasons, in Chambers, the Lord Chief Justice was of the view 47 that the tweet was of a trivial nature and was inconsistent with a credible threat. He was fortified in this conclusion by three other factors. First, the words were posted on Twitter, where they could be read by anyone 48 . Secondly, that it was unusual for a terrorist threat to enable the writer to be readily identified. Thirdly, that it would be difficult to imagine a serious threat that was accessible by a large number of people in plenty of time to enable the action threatened to be prevented. It is at this point, it is suggested, that the Divisional Court veered off into dangerous territory, for this passage contains assumptions about the way people behave.
These assumptions may be grounded in experience but stray from the central issue of the meaning and import of the words actually used. Suppose a clever terrorist who decides to engage in a form of double bluff by using social media (having of course taken steps to 43 S. ensure anonymity, though this may not matter if he is a suicide bomber) and imitating the language of the faux outraged would-be traveller. It is surely much safer to rely on actualities in order to determine the meaning and import of words than to stray outside this approach and rest on assumptions, however well intentioned, even as secondary fortification for a conclusion that has been arrived at by examination of concrete evidence.
The Divisional Court did not need to go beyond its interpretation of the words used by
Chambers to arrive at the conclusion that this was not a message of a menacing character as 61 Such as the offences of using threatening or abusive words or behaviour likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress contained in s.5. S.57(2) Crime and Courts Act 2013 removed the word "insulting" from s.5 which may have an impact on its usefulness in the present context in those cases to which it is applicable. 62 The guidance refers to the people being targeted, but the ambit of s.5 is wider than this. 63 For an offence under s.5, the relevant provision is s.5(2). remains that the reach of the civil law in relation to the online misuse of private information is underwhelming, ineffective and vague. Accordingly, the role of the civil law in this context is somewhat remote and this lends support to the argument that further development in the legal arena of online abuse is necessitated so as to find some neutral ground between the excesses of the criminal law and the luke warm, ambiguous and piecemeal involvement of the civil law, particularly when it comes to trivial information.
Conclusions
The A common principle of both arms of law considered in this article is that there is a lack of clarity about the scope of acceptable disclosure, particularly in relation to the posting of trivial information, which causes individuals to be ill-informed about the law and causes judges to misinterpret online commentary. The result is one of fragmentation rather than a coherent body of law founded on clear and appropriate principles fit for the purposes of 21 st century communications. The present legal landscape attaching to online communications is, therefore, ill-judged, ineffective and confusing. However, the law can be made meaningful and effective and, in pursuit of this outcome, various recommendations follow, each of which is built on the premise that the law is rightly confined to only the most serious cases.
As far as the criminal law is concerned, there are clearly instances where criminal sanctions are appropriate. However, the remit of criminal sanction must not be too overbearing and stifling of free speech. Cases like Chambers fall short of the requisite balancing act that criminal regulation must achieve if it is to offer protection without being too oppressive. As the European Court of Human Rights has reiterated throughout its body of case law 79 ever since its landmark 1976 Handyside judgment 80 , freedom of expression protects not only "favourable" expression but also that which "shocks, offends or disturbs". We suggest that a nuanced approach is called for in which allowance is made for assessing how 'credible' threats are in varied contexts of online communication and according to contemporary societal standards -effectively an attempt to guide the rising generation of users of social media 81 . We suggest that the old fragmented approach should be abandoned in favour of a more coherent set of offences which are designed specifically for social media rather than being adapted from existing laws designed for different circumstances. They should take into account the ways in which the medium is used: writing a letter is a very different form of activity to tweeting, for example. Such offences should also take account of the type of user:
users of a platform such as Facebook, for example, are more likely to be younger rather than older people. 79 See the cases referred to at n.59. 80 Reported at (1979-80) 1 EHRR 737. 81 The Department for Education has produced a guide in an attempt to tackle cyber bullying: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/368340/preventing_and_tackling _bullying_october14.pdf (last accessed 2 April 2015).
Additionally, we envisage an increased role for the civil law to deal with the lower level of inappropriate communications in order to avoid such communications being beyond the reach of the law. In order to address matters of clarity, this would involve the creation of a specific civil wrong underpinned by statute. One of the major benefits of a new and independent tort is that it would both allow for a more structured decision-making framework, which would assist a court in assessing when information, even that which is trivial, is judged as intrinsically private 82 and help to clarify the consequences of sharing private information.
We envisage that the creation of a statutory tort would, therefore, assist in the identification It will, however, also need to be malleable enough to remain stable and useful without being unnecessarily broad and uncertain 94 . It would, moreover, require the identification of a moving target and attempting to identify foreseeable future infringements of privacy is, therefore, extremely problematic. Accordingly, as Eady has argued extra-judicially, "it would be wholly impractical to descend to the level of micro-management and to anticipate every situation that is likely to come before the courts. One never ceases to be amazed by the extraordinary range of scenarios that present themselves. No legislator could possibly think them up in advance" 95 . Similarly, since we also lack the language for the technological future, the technical complexity and pace of change is so great that the structuring of a statutory tort would require to be drafted at a level of generality that would still require some degree of judicial intervention to resolve disputes 96 . Nonetheless, the type of demarcation that could be envisaged based on Wacks' taxonomy might make a positive impact at addressing the uncertainty that particularly surrounds trivial information.
Whilst the threshold for what might constitute private information would need to be determined on the basis of consultation, it might arguably fall below the current threshold of the criminal law. Given the lower level of legal intervention, this might catch those who may be on the road to more seriously inappropriate conduct and might also cause individuals to think about what they send or post in future. The lower threshold and lower standard of proof would enable individuals to be brought within the system without the need for criminal proceedings, without the consequences attaching to a criminal conviction and without the intervention of the police.
In keeping with other areas of the civil law, in which enforcement is in the hands of bodies such as local authorities, we consider that a body specifically charged with enforcement should be established 97 and that, rather than an award of compensation, individuals should be required to attend a course designed to educate them as to appropriate usage 98 . This would go some way to meeting one of the major issues relating to the use of social media, namely the idea that anything can be posted on the internet with impunity, as such a course would alert users to the possible consequences of inappropriate posting. This proposal will therefore educate the public about the value of privacy and this is considered an important part of crafting a regulatory solution that ensures privacy becomes a public good for online users 99 . behaviours, might be regarded as rightly incurring legal responsibility. This, we argue, can be achieved by putting in to effect the practical suggestions detailed above, which, by speaking to the contours, customs and practices of online communications, improve the applicability and usefulness of both criminal and civil law in the context of online communications.
